A Bout of Indiscretion or Selfless Love: The Case of India, Pakistan and Kashmir

Author:  TWI

The involvement of Pakistan in Kashmir’s illegitimate struggle for self-determination is proving counter-productive for several reasons. The prime amongst these is Pakistan’s growing reputation as a terrorist state. Its intelligence agency is accused of siring several extremist organisations, both within and in neighbouring countries. Post 9-11, the argument of a genuine home-grown self-determination struggle has very few takers with all violence being labelled terrorism. With the Mumbai attacks and growing evidence of Pakistan’s involvement, the odds are against Pakistan on all fronts. The Kashmir Movement will do well to distance itself, lest the effort comes into disrepute as solely a brain-child of Pakistan.

FACEMASKS AND GRAFFITI DO NOT AN INTIFADA MAKE – SEPARATING PALESTINE AND KASHMIR

Author:  TWI

Every prolonged instance of stone-throwing by a disorderly Muslim crowd is not Intifada. The word and the sentiment belongs to West Asia and specifically to Palestine. Facemasks and graffiti are not the only components of an Intifada. Kashmir is not Palestine, India is not Israel.

This analogy, of comparing Kashmir with Palestine, has been making a hum for some time now. Scholars, genuine and otherwise, debating the possible solutions to either areas of tumult have looked around to seek intellectual inspiration and inevitably the Muslim component of the population has brought about the comparison. Others, seeking to promote Kashmir as an extension of Global Jihad have made similar observations. The uninformed have played along.

Talk at DSSC: A Company Commander's Perspective on Counter Terrorist Operations

Author:  TWI

INTRODUCTION

1.       Most of us have served in the Counter Insurgency environment of Jammu and Kashmir.  Some as Coy Commanders, some as Staff Officers and some as part of other arms and services deployed in the qualifying area.   On termination of the course, I suspect that many of us, some sooner than the others, will go back to the same environment, though possibly in a different capacity and some will even be commanding units in Counter Insurgency areas in a couple of years.  I have done two tenures in the valley.  The first was with 10 PARA (SF) and the second with 4 PARA (SF) just before I came here.  The first was immensely successful in terms of operational successes.  The second was in two parts – one before the Staff College exam and the other after I got back to the unit after the exam.  The first part is a personal low in my life for operational successes were few and the second when I decided to shift operations to the area of responsibility of a different Formation was once again very fruitful.  For various reasons.  Today I wish to share with you some thoughts on the factors which influence success in CT ops and given the fact that most of us are going to find ourselves in the same environment once again, sooner than later, what should we keep in mind as Coy Cdrs, Battalion Commanders and Staff Officers.