The AFSPA Debate: Who Will Bite the Bullet?

Author: TWI

Why does the Army insist on continuing in the hinterland when none of the stakeholders want them? The politicians are branding the Army as unreasonable to oppose the revocation of AFSPA. The Police want to go it alone. Why is the Army over-staying the welcome? With a few years of relative peace behind us, it is time for tough decisions. The Army has the capability to handle any surge in terrorism at a later stage. The Army owes it to its martyrs that its noble intentions are not branded as vested interests and it is not painted as a villain in the politics of the Valley.

Endgame in Afghanistan: Debating the Kashmir Connection

Author: TWI

“America is history, Karzai is history, the Taliban are the future… Pakistan would be unwise to cut all contacts and goodwill with the future leaders of Afghanistan” [1]

Lt Gen Hamid Gul

Former Chief of ISI

A

s the US and NATO’s misadventure in Afghanistan draws to a close with the promise of the withdrawal of their troops sooner than later, a debate gains ground on the possible implications of the US withdrawal, for the region in general and Kashmir in particular. That there will be a vacuum post the departure of the Americans is certain. Who will fill it in, and how will circumstances play out, remains a matter analysts worldwide are feeding-off at the moment. However, given the number of global and regional players involved, their mutual distrust, scant respect for honouring agreements and a preference for exploiting proxies makes the region a tangle where there are more questions than answers. Non State Actors with their proclivity for the capricious and whimsical rather than the predictable and anticipated and the power games that have come to characterise the expanse from Iran to Pakistan make the future uncertain. Presently, what appears achievable is a consideration of influencing factors, the nature and concerns - derived from history - of the thespians involved and the circumstances sanctioned for the next few years. This will help us arrive at a pragmatic appraisal of the future of Afghanistan and the implications, if any, for Kashmir.

     

A Bout of Indiscretion or Selfless Love: The Case of India, Pakistan and Kashmir

Author:  TWI

The involvement of Pakistan in Kashmir’s illegitimate struggle for self-determination is proving counter-productive for several reasons. The prime amongst these is Pakistan’s growing reputation as a terrorist state. Its intelligence agency is accused of siring several extremist organisations, both within and in neighbouring countries. Post 9-11, the argument of a genuine home-grown self-determination struggle has very few takers with all violence being labelled terrorism. With the Mumbai attacks and growing evidence of Pakistan’s involvement, the odds are against Pakistan on all fronts. The Kashmir Movement will do well to distance itself, lest the effort comes into disrepute as solely a brain-child of Pakistan.

FACEMASKS AND GRAFFITI DO NOT AN INTIFADA MAKE – SEPARATING PALESTINE AND KASHMIR

Author:  TWI

Every prolonged instance of stone-throwing by a disorderly Muslim crowd is not Intifada. The word and the sentiment belongs to West Asia and specifically to Palestine. Facemasks and graffiti are not the only components of an Intifada. Kashmir is not Palestine, India is not Israel.

This analogy, of comparing Kashmir with Palestine, has been making a hum for some time now. Scholars, genuine and otherwise, debating the possible solutions to either areas of tumult have looked around to seek intellectual inspiration and inevitably the Muslim component of the population has brought about the comparison. Others, seeking to promote Kashmir as an extension of Global Jihad have made similar observations. The uninformed have played along.

Talk at DSSC: A Company Commander's Perspective on Counter Terrorist Operations

Author:  TWI

INTRODUCTION

1.       Most of us have served in the Counter Insurgency environment of Jammu and Kashmir.  Some as Coy Commanders, some as Staff Officers and some as part of other arms and services deployed in the qualifying area.   On termination of the course, I suspect that many of us, some sooner than the others, will go back to the same environment, though possibly in a different capacity and some will even be commanding units in Counter Insurgency areas in a couple of years.  I have done two tenures in the valley.  The first was with 10 PARA (SF) and the second with 4 PARA (SF) just before I came here.  The first was immensely successful in terms of operational successes.  The second was in two parts – one before the Staff College exam and the other after I got back to the unit after the exam.  The first part is a personal low in my life for operational successes were few and the second when I decided to shift operations to the area of responsibility of a different Formation was once again very fruitful.  For various reasons.  Today I wish to share with you some thoughts on the factors which influence success in CT ops and given the fact that most of us are going to find ourselves in the same environment once again, sooner than later, what should we keep in mind as Coy Cdrs, Battalion Commanders and Staff Officers.