Author: TWI
INTRODUCTION
1. Most of us have served in the Counter Insurgency environment of Jammu and Kashmir. Some as Coy Commanders, some as Staff Officers and some as part of other arms and services deployed in the qualifying area. On termination of the course, I suspect that many of us, some sooner than the others, will go back to the same environment, though possibly in a different capacity and some will even be commanding units in Counter Insurgency areas in a couple of years. I have done two tenures in the valley. The first was with 10 PARA (SF) and the second with 4 PARA (SF) just before I came here. The first was immensely successful in terms of operational successes. The second was in two parts – one before the Staff College exam and the other after I got back to the unit after the exam. The first part is a personal low in my life for operational successes were few and the second when I decided to shift operations to the area of responsibility of a different Formation was once again very fruitful. For various reasons. Today I wish to share with you some thoughts on the factors which influence success in CT ops and given the fact that most of us are going to find ourselves in the same environment once again, sooner than later, what should we keep in mind as Coy Cdrs, Battalion Commanders and Staff Officers.
AIM
2. Simply put, the aim of my talk today is to Echo the Coy Cdrs point of view on Counter Terrorist Operations in Op Rakshak and suggest an approach to dealing with the pressures from the environment. Even as I say that please don’t expect me to pull out any rabbits or suggest the winning recipe because if you have lived the environment with your body and mind I will only be reflecting what you would have experienced or thought in passing. Also this talk is Valley centric.
SCOPE
3. To enable a systematic flow I will cover the talk in three parts as shown :-
(a) Part 1 - Defining success in CT ops. In part one I will endeavour to define success from different perspectives.
(b) Part 2 - Drawbacks in the present CT effort. Next, I will dwell on what ails the CT effort today.
(c) Part 1 – Our Role. Part three will highlight the role of commanders and staff officers in breeding success.
PART 1 DEFINING SUCCESS IN COUNTER TERRORIST OPERATIONS
4. Moving onto part 1 : Army’s Definition of Success in CT Ops. The Army has laid down criteria for gauging the success of units employed in CT Ops. These are revised every now and then to provide importance to one factor over another as the situation traverses one phase to the other. Broadly speaking these comprise :-
(a) No of terrorists killed in ops.
(b) Apprehensions and Surrenders – though they severely lack the romance of the factor listed above.
(c) Own cas.
(d) Minimum untoward incidents to include :-
(i) IED incidents.
(ii) Incidents of Fratricide.
(iii) MT accidents.
(iv) Attacks on posts.
(v) Civ cas – by own or terrorist fire.
(vi) Custodial deaths.
5. Additional Yardsticks for Gauging Success. Some additional yardsticks for gauging the success of a unit could be :-
(a) The relative freedom enjoyed by the local population.
(b) The attempts at recruitment by the terrorists.
(c) Int flow leading to successful operations.
(d) The No of civilian administration representatives working in a unit’s area of responsibility.
6. How successful one emerges from a stint in CT ops is also a matter of perception and is bound to be defined differently by people depending on the role or appointment he is holding.
(a) Coy Cdr. For a Coy Cdr success would translate into the No of kills he has compared to other Coy Cdrs, his hold on his area for some best demonstrated by the submissive gestures of the populace every time they happen to across his patrol, his int network and how indispensable his Commanding Officer makes him feel and whether or not his men think the world of him.
(b) Bn Cdr. For the Bn Cdr it would translate into whether or not be has been able to beat the last Commanding Officer at the No Game, his Battalion’s standing in the count tally listed in the fmn ops room in Arial Black Font 72, the glances of approval from the Sector or Brigade Commander, actually given or so interpreted, particularly in the presence of others; how happy a team he has been able to make out of what had been handed over to him, the extent of his or his superiors Key Result Areas he has been able to fulfil by optimum use of the resources – both men and material – at his disposal and all this eventually translating into securing a vacancy on the coveted Higher Command Course. So the probability is he is perceived as a successful bn cdr by himself and by the organization if at the end of the command he is nominated for this All-That-Matters course. Maybe exceptions exist to prove the rule.
(c) Staff Officer in the G Branch at Sector HQ. Now what does this gentleman have at stake. Success for him lies in ensuring that the 10 post protection patrols and the specified No of roll downs or lagav patrols or sunai operations are reflected in the sitrep fulfilling every day the magical percentage figure specified by the Higher HQ. He gets to hob-nob with the Cdr often and at times ends up reflecting the cdr’s personality. He may gauge his success by the No of his suggestions accepted by the Cdr, the No of occasions he has been able to influence the Cdrs mind regarding the performance and attitude of the units, how often he is called upon by the Cdr to express an opinion, whether or not he is used as a sounding board for operational planning, favourable comments on his powerpoint prowess, etc. Also contributing to his I-am-successful feeling are the comments of visiting VIPs which invariably get discussed for two days after the visit and stem from the No of successful ops done by the formation and so we come back to the No Game.
PART TWO – DRAWBACKS IN THE PRESENT CT EFFORT
7. Now I would like to highlight some of the drawbacks in the present CT effort. This is purely from a Team Cdrs perspective. There may be compulsions and pressures with the changing environment which result in such manifestations but let’s for a second disregard them and think for the coy cdr.
8. The No Game. This appears to be the driving force which keeps the Army going. But this factor is also singularly responsible for all that on lookers find wrong with the Army’s approach in the valley. And I am not talking only about the pressure from higher ups. As Coy Cdrs too we only end up disproving it when we hit a dry patch. When our coy or bn is on a roll we love the attention that comes with op success. And then those cribbing about the pressure to perform sound like whimps who are less possessed of soldierly attributes. No doubt as soldiers it is our duty to go after the bad guys and nobody can dispute that. The point here is it should be justified. You know what I mean when I say that op success should not be “by hook or by crook”. Enough said.
9. Involvement of Senior Commanders. As a Troop Commander I hated it when the Team Cdr went out on ops with me. I felt tied down, unable to exercise initiative and having to do his bidding in a contact. The situation has now changed. For the worse. Now if one makes contact a Commanding Officer is expected to be there and god forbid if it is someplace where vehicles can reach then you will have the entire brass within range descend on the location. The terrorist will be the least of your worries when the Sector Cdr with a royal codename like Shahenshah will lean in on your net and demand to know the latest. Pronto. Why do they get involved at that level? Is it because the junior officers are not competent in basic tactics? No. Is it because they want to arrest any situation before it goes out of hand? Maybe. Is it because the soldier in them demands part of the action? No way. Do the terrorists even deserve the involvement of an officer who has spent upwards of thirty years in uniform? After all most of them are nothing beyond mere gun-toting ruffians. But you have Corps Cdrs drawing fancy plans – moving bdes and sectors in the vain hope of sanitizing the entire valley in one grand operation. It doesn’t work that way. As coy cdrs you and I know what we have thought of these operations.
10. Diminishing Profile of the Coy and Bn Cdr. Ten years back the RR Coy Cdr was a big man. That was when Counter Insurgency was a Coy Cdrs job. Now with the top brass getting overtly involved the common man is acutely aware of the hierarchy not in terms of how big the GOC is but how small the Coy Cdr is. All and sundry have access to higher HQs and so you have intelligence that comes from say the Force or Corps HQs. Need I tell you the worth of int generated beyond the battalion HQs and in some rare cases the Sector HQ. Many of you would have launched ops knowing fully well the bogus nature of the source and the worthlessness of the int. But you did it because the int emanated from higher HQ and the CO couldn’t risk the source going back and telling his masters that the bn did not give it a sincere try. The erstwhile coy cdr generated his int, planned and executed his own ops. Today’s coy cdr does not have time for that. After this bn operation ends, comes the sector operation followed by the joint ops with the neighboring sector and so on. Quantity over-rules quality.
11. The Name Game. What’s this? After every successful operation you have been approached by the civil police, the Special Task Force or the Special Operations Group representative and most prominently, officers from our int corps – NCCLU or CISU – to get their name incorporated in the sitrep as the source of intelligence for that operation. And you have obliged in the vain hope that he will repay your kindness with some hard intelligence in the near future which will help you pluck one from the Chakra Series. Also aren’t you supposed to keep the police on your right side? Not that the int agencies are dry. They do come up with something valuable once in a while. But the fact is that the phenomenon I mentioned is fast gaining ground and has become an accepted modus operandus for the intelligence agencies. And then there’s this thing about joint operations. Sometimes you come across intelligence related to the neighbouring battalion’s area of responsibility. Whether or not a particular unit is involved, if the contact is in their area of operations then they will stake a claim to part of the success. If you kill two terrorists, one will be reflected against their name. A sort of tax for allowing you to operate. A successful operation without this pact is viewed as a low of face. There’s food for thought there.
12. So What have You Done Today?. Every evening the GSO1 at every level will call up the units or formation under him to know whats going on. This gets reflected in the form of a sitrep. If anybody believes a force can sustain the level of operations that are usually reflected then please also believe that I am the king of Spain. Enough said.
13. Since I can only talk for so long, I have highlighted only a few aspects which I thought deserved mention. Now moving along to Part III.
PART 3 – OUR ROLE
14. Now I will talk briefly about what we can do as Bn Cdrs and Staff Offrs. Again due to obvious reason I will highlight only a few aspects.
(a) Bn Cdr. As the Bn Cdr you are a very powerful man. You control the lives of 800 to 1000 men. You are the Mai-Baap for your command. Nick-named `Tiger’. Knowing the pyramid like structure of our organization, chances are you might not see this power again. Live it up. The way the Special Forces operate I have interacted very closely with a No of units and I am convinced that the CO is the pillar on which will rest a happy team. Coy Cdrs discuss only two things – the terrorists and their CO. What does his role involve? From the numerous bullets running through your head, I will talk only about two.
(i) Avoid over Ambition. Ambition is good. Over-ambition is sacrilege. This unit is many things but the one thing it doesn’t deserve to be is a stepping stone for an eager-beaver Commanding Officer and his aspirations. Think beyond the two years of your command. Don’t use, motivate; don’t exploit, inspire. Examples are pointless for I have no doubt that you know what I am saying.
(ii) Manage the Environment. That’s the prime task for the CO. I will touch upon two major components only – the unit atmosphere and the higher HQs. Pressures are inevitable but don’t let them percolate. Don’t force your Coy Cdrs to engage in radio warfare by tasking them beyond their physical capability. Look for the round peg for the round hole. When mistakes do occur, as they will – differentiate between error of intent and error of judgement and take a stand if required. `All the Best’ is a better parting shot for a column heading out than to infuse caution at the eleventh hour by saying `Be careful I don’t want any civ cas’. Project realistically, for projection of a job well done is a real-world requirement. Pre-empt situations which are likely to be detrimental to the unit’s image and work overtime to explain your point of view. Liaison and documentation should be the COs forte so nobody can rough-shod the battalion – it ends up with the awards and recognition it deserves. The Army has a laid down criterion for judging operational performance which finally brings in the coveted COAS citation. Know it well and exploit the knowledge but within moral limits. Use it so an opportunity does not go a-begging. Keep effective liaison with the police and the Para Military Forces. Lately, I have seen so many COs being bullied by the police brass because the COs are fearful that they have direct access to higher HQ and consequently the power to influence the image of the unit.
(b) Coy Cdr. The most important cog in the machine. For the important role he has to play I have chosen four aspects.
(i) Watch your Motivation. Never let circumstances and attitudes get
the better of you. I had spoken of how I had an unsuccessful stint for a while. I realized later that I got bogged down by the uncooperative attitude in that formation. Our operations were invariably compromised by the units and its difficult to establish contact with terrorists when they know you are around. Even in the event of a contact, he’s alert and chances of a missed contact that much higher. That’s precisely what happened with us. As a Team Cdr I could not establish a rapport with the units especially the COs and just hoped that sooner or later things would work out. They never did. Some motivated Coy Cdrs totally give up on operations because they get cowed down by the COs attitude.
(ii) Train Your Comd. It’s important to train to the strengths while trying to neutralize the weaknesses. A chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Don’t over reach. Be strong in the basics i.e field craft, physical endurance and firing. Leave the romantic issues such as covert ops and small team ops for later. Be successful first. Again I had faltered here. I had moved from an old Special Forces battalion to a newly designated one. I took a lot for granted and did not appreciate the different method I should have pursued immediately and by the time I did a lot of water had run past the proverbial bridge. Consequently we had a No of missed contacts, some very callous ones. The RR units have adopted a very effective approach by constituting QRTs for every coy. The motivated ones go out to operate and they are given a few perks to keep them going.
(iii) Be Realistic. It’s no use being naïve and trying to pursue an overly idealistic pipe dream. Recognise the hard realities and be pragmatic. However draw your own lines of morality and having done that don’t stop. Pressures will be there and sometimes there will be encouragement to do the easier wrong. So watch it.
(iv) Anticipate. Pre-empt anything and everything. Be alert. Think and be involved with the situation. Grey matter makes a difference only if you can use it. We had this Coy Cdr in 47 RR. Bordering on obesity and totally unimpressive. But he could think. He wouldn’t do any long drawn difficult operations. He would spend time drawing a pattern, luring and one fine night he would strike. Till the time he was there the battalion’s count was ticking.
(c) Staff Officer. Since the Sector Cdr is beyond us we will talk about his staff officer. So you get posted there and you don’t have any CT experience so far. A couple of months down the line – writing those sitreps, reading those intreps, hearing those intercepts and the talk around you, you think you know the game. You don’t. Grant it to those guys who are jungle bashing, plodding through the night and appreciate the effort. There may be some who won’t put in the same effort but for God’s sake don’t generalise. In your conversations don’t write off units. Be careful when you talk to the Cdr, for in that place there might be times when you are the only coy for him and he might actually be listening to what you are saying. Every time you switch on that flashlight to go from your office to your room think how difficult it is for the guys out there. I have found high handedness – in the manner of talking and dealing with the unit officers and adjts a very common phenomenon amongst staff officers. If still you think you can do it better go out and spend a week on ops. Not hopping around from post to post like a visiting dignitary but on actual ops. You will be a wiser man. Relieve the stress don’t cause it. I spoke about two topics that the guys in the unit love to talk about. Add another. The sector staff. For you do influence their lives. Try and be apart of them. And for those of us who have been through the rut and get an opportunity to be a staff officer don’t forget your days. The major role for the staff offr as far as the units go is to coord matters which require coord. Particularly for joint operations. They can handle the rest. And see if you can keep the Cdr from breathing down their neck.
CONCLUSION
15. Gentlemen I have touched upon a few issues which related to the atmosphere in a counter Insurgency environment. Success implies feeling good about the job you are doing, it’s about making a positive difference to the environment and deriving satisfaction from that. To end a CT stint on a high it is imperative that the yardsticks for success be defined by us individually rather than just trying to measure up to those laid down. More often than not these will be intangible but important all the same to give you the I-am-a-winner feel.
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