Author: TWI
T |
he discourse on failed states, dominant through the 1990s, is fuelled afresh by the Failed States Index (FSI)[1]sponsored by the Fund for Peace and supported by Foreign Policy since 2005. Expectedly, the applicability of the 12 indicators[2] being used to judge the extent of failure of Nation States has been debated for their apparent common treatment of disparate circumstances in societies spanning the nether to the first world. Consider a social factor like ‘Continual Human Flight’ described as ‘brain drain’ of professionals, intellectuals and political dissidents, intentional emigration of the middle class or ethnic population to other places of the State or any other State. Or an economic indicator like ‘Imbalance in Economic Development’ defined as inequality and injustice against a group or a tribe in education, jobs, and economic status according to their communal or religious identity. Any discerning analyst, without a goose to cook, will amplify incessantly the resultant discrepancy from applying the same yardstick to States that have evolved and stabilised over seven centuries as against those having a history countable in mere decades.
Most interesting is the political indicator ‘External Intervention’ that credits points for the extent of interference in internal affairs of a State through military and economic assistance. Apparently, one factor feeds the other. The current Western academic and political thought process hinges on the premise that failed or crisis states provide the space for terrorists to practice their craft.[3]Even as that is easily refuted[4], the fact remains that the origin or deterioration of crises can, more often than not, be traced to a Western power. The insistence on democratic norms as the panacea for all ills of a seemingly failed state stems from ignorance of the societal structures existing across the globe.With Pakistan’s status as a frontline state in the war in Afghanistan and its tribal areas, international journalists are patronising its high-end hotels. They are picking tit-bits from the grapevine and with a remarkable discounting of the tribal and religious compulsionsof a conservative society accentuated by foreign intervention, are currently pregnant with predictions of Pakistan’s impending doom.
The Failed States Index – An Analysis of Pakistan
Figure 1 gives a comparison of four countries on the FSI[5]. Finland is deemed the most successful State amongst the 178 assessed, Pakistan is at 13, India at 78 and the United States of America at 159. The higher the rank, the closer is a country to state failure.
Failed States Index 2013
|
Total
|
Demographic Pressures
|
Refugees and IDPs
|
Group Grievance
|
Human Flight
|
Imbalanced Economic Development
|
Poverty and Economic Decline
|
Legitimacy of the State
|
Public Services
|
Human Rights
|
Security Apparatus
|
Factionalized Elites
|
External Intervention
| |
13
|
Pakistan
|
102.9
|
8.9
|
9.1
|
9.7
|
6.9
|
7.9
|
7.5
|
8.4
|
7.3
|
8.7
|
9.8
|
9.2
|
9.6
|
79
|
India
|
77.5
|
7.5
|
5.2
|
8.2
|
5.4
|
8.1
|
5.4
|
5.2
|
6.7
|
5.9
|
7.8
|
6.8
|
5.2
|
159
|
United States
|
33.5
|
3.0
|
2.3
|
4.2
|
1.0
|
4.8
|
3.2
|
2.3
|
2.4
|
3.2
|
2.2
|
3.9
|
1.0
|
178
|
Finland
|
18.0
|
1.9
|
1.6
|
1.4
|
2.3
|
1.0
|
3.2
|
1.0
|
1.5
|
1.1
|
1.0
|
1.1
|
1.0
|
Figure 1: Comparison of the FSI indicators for Pakistan, India, USA and Finland. A higher rank is indicative of relative failure of a state.
The aggregate score is trusted to give an indication of the relative failure or success of a State. Given that the difference in aggregate score between Pakistan and India is a mere 25.4 points, between India and the USA a much wider 44 points and that between India and Finland a yawning 59.5 points, the relative success of India as compared to Pakistan can be called into question. There’s little doubt that Pakistan suffers the ills of over-coverage in the media, its apparent centrality and perceived failure in the fight against Global Terrorism earning it bad press. A Malala in India may be relegated to the depths of online versions by the international media, but in Pakistan she is the epitome of liberal thought and a mascot of the civilised world in its fight against medieval savages. A closer scrutiny reveals, to the utter horror of some, that India ups Pakistan in ‘Imbalanced Economic Development’.
However, according to the Fund for Peace, the past one year has witnessed most indicators either worsen or remain constant for Pakistan, yielding a higher aggregate score and consequently, an indication that Pakistan is closer (if not declared already) to being a failed state.
Consider the graph at Figure 2[6]. It gives the status of Pakistan in the FSI over the past eight years. The graph is indicative of Pakistan’s capacity for a rapid spike or decline in the aggregate scores with highly uneven changes in individual indicators.
The Stability-Instability Conundrum: Consideration of Factors Contributing to the Impasse
Is Pakistan a failed state? Internationally the debate came to the fore in the aftermath of the Cold War and was enlivened after the 9/11 Twin Tower bombings. Within India, the examination has been perennial since the inception of the Pakistani State, founded on the Two-Nation Theory as a separate home for Indian Muslims. It gained renewed vigour after its dismemberment in 1971 and is currently at a feverish pitch given the sectarian and ideological strife engulfing Pakistan. That Pakistan is complicit in fanning turmoil within India apparently biases the Indian verdict. Most events confronting the state of Pakistan today also afflict a number of developing nations. Some factors play a dual role of at once - inducing instability while preventing collapse.
The Domineering Crisis Debate
Most studies on Pakistan have focussed on the implications of its crisis on neighbouring countries and the West, particularly the United States[7]. While it has had its troubled times (one of them being the present); it has ultimately emerged from these, albeit without much credit to its democratic credentials. Similarly, a number of States deemed successful have grappled with various crises ranging from humanitarian to economic.Unfortunately for Pakistan, the evaluation of its crisis, particularly the failure of its security apparatus, nationalism and sovereignty, tends to obfuscate any worthwhile enquiry into its varied and dynamic aspects as a nation. A holistic approach is perhaps the ‘beyond crisis’ perspective[8] which seeks to focus the discussion on the everyday life of Pakistanis as the epicentre of any discourse on the state and its sovereignty. This diverts the blame of state failure on the nature of state and the influencing powers while preserving the impressions of society, actually presenting it as vibrant and peace-oriented. Every Indian delegation of politicians, artists, journalists and the like that visit Pakistan testify to this nature of Pakistani society at large.
Crisis of Nationalism
We are a nation of a hundred million, and, what is more, we are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, name and nomenclature, sense of value and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and tradition, aptitude and ambitions; in short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life. By all canons of international law we are a nation.
MA Jinnah, 1945
A crisis of nationalism, spurred by the belief in disrespect for ethnic identity and the norms of demographic majority prompted the separation of East Pakistan. The Bengali Hindus and Hindu-influenced Bengali culture was considered alien and inferior to the Pakistani fibre considered exclusive to West Pakistan.[9] Further, the concept of the nation state runs contrary to the tenets of Islam, the founding argument for Pakistan. The likes of Maududi[10] thought of the concept of nationhood as a Western or Indian conspiracy to divide the Ummah.[11]
Faiz Ahmed Faiz, renowned poet and author, attempted to undermine the centrality of Islam as the foundation of the Pakistani nation and instead justify a unique culture for Pakistan[12]. He opined that ‘nationhood and culture are two sides of the same coin’. However, his arguments to wrap East Pakistan in the same culture mould come across as manufactured with more similarities between India and West Pakistan than between the two wings of Pakistan. Jinnah’s exhortation above appears to be the purview of an Islamic state and not so much as a culturally different nation. Is there, to counter the yardstick he lays down, a Pakistani culture? Or is it merely Islamic culture that defines Pakistan? Pakistan projects a confusing picture of its priorities to the international observer. What comes first: the obligation to the Nation or the commitments to the Ummah? Perhaps not even Pakistanis can concur on that.
Threat of Balkanisation
Provincialism and tribal affiliations, the nemesis of nationalism, are the concepts that most Pakistanis answer to. Punjabi, Baluchi, Pashtun, Sindhi, Mohajir and Kashmiri interests make for a more passionate appeal than does the Pakistani cause. Nationalism is restricted to the Establishment comprising the Army, administrative and political elites. Consequently, abetted by charges of preferential treatment to Punjabis at the expense of the other identities, several separatist movements have cropped up. Baluchis have been pressing for a Baluchistan, Pashtuns for Pashtunistan and Sindhis for Sindhudesh. Given the penchant across Pakistan for wielding guns, supporters of the movements invariably take recourse to violence.
Democracy and the Failure of Leadership
The proclivity for military rule has ensured that civilian authority has been severely undermined for much of Pakistan’s history.The military administrators have invariably been supported by the Western powers and strange though it is, the periods of military rule have been the most stable episodes for Pakistan. Even as military rule has been high-handed in most cases, attempting to run the country with the decisive dictatorial methods one associates with the military, the civilian institutions have been complicit in legitimizing the coups. Opposition parties have colluded with the military to depose elected governments; the judiciary has taken oath of allegiance to successive dictators. Corrupt and power-hungry politicians have consented to be the confederation that has furthered the dictator’s ambitions.
Prolonged military rule has, however, taught the political parties to throw in their lot together. It was witnessed in the formation of the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy, an amalgam of the major political parties to counter Gen Musharraf’s regime[13]. This is indicative of the preference of the people of Pakistan for civilian rule and consequently of democracy. Unfortunately, the various bouts of democracy have been besotted with corruption and a breakdown of law and order. The people of Pakistan have therefore looked to the military to rescue them from corrupt leadership. The military is presently convinced that interfering with democracy does not augur well for a professional army but as Zia-ul-Haq often joked: the military has to step in to correct the qibla[14] of the politicians, who are largely accepted as having scant interest in national security. The military continues to wield disproportionate influence in foreign policy, particularly where relations with India, Afghanistan and the US are concerned. For the first time since its creation, Pakistan has witnessed the handover between two democratically elected governments in the general elections held this year.
Islamic Fundamentalism
The pet animal has turned on its owner. General Zia-ul-Haq’s investment in exploiting religion to consolidate his constituency, abetted in no small measure by US largesse during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has become the hydra-headed monster that threatens its erstwhile patrons most. The daily mayhem being witnessed in Afghanistan and Pakistan is a Jihad being fought on two fronts. The first against foreign troops by the Afghan Taliban and the other against fellow Muslims by the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) and its allies Lashkar-e-Janghvi(LeJ) and Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP)[15].Sectarian violence against the Hazaras, targeting of Christians and Mohajirs has driven a wedge that threatens an outbreak of civil war. That the LeJ is alleged to have the patronage of the state, particularly the Frontier Corps, further fuels the sense of alienation[16]. However, in response, the capacities of the Army and Para-Military Forces tasked to deal with the upsurge in violence have been upgraded largely due to the infusion of Counter Insurgency funds from the USA. Faced with the grim circumstance of terrorism in Punjab, the Army has taken the fight to the terrorist’s strongholds and met with varying degrees of success. Its capacity to neutralise the threat from anti-state groups is suspect. Several factors[17] have led to peace deals with some groups while the others remain reticent and continue to be countered.The violence has also led to increased internal displacement and immigration of the affected populations.
Another upshot of the violence has been that the majority of the population now backs using force to prevent the militants and their ideology from gaining ground. Peace deals are frowned upon.While the concoction of violent militant groups seems ominous, the Pakistan Army has held its own and continues to enjoy the backing of the citizenry by large.
The Establishment: Obsession with Kashmir
The people running the show in Pakistan – the military and intelligence agencies, affluent businessmen,aristocrats, select politicians and civil servants, and academia are popularly referred to as the Establishment[18]. This conglomerate has proved to be the main reason why Pakistan refuses to fail despite all indications to the contrary. Though many ills that confront Pakistan could possibly be traced to the weak policies promulgated by the Establishment, this coterie alone has the necessary expertise and focus of intent in national security to ensure that Pakistan can continue to survive. The military’s iron-grip on matters relating to foreign policy is a consequence of its effort at maintaining its relevance and retaining power. That the Establishment is nationalistic cannot be doubted. Whether the components of their nationalism are misplaced can be debated no end. One description of the Establishment has been given by Stephen P. Cohen in his book the Idea of Pakistan. Membership in this oligarchy, Cohen contends, requires adherence to a common set of beliefs: that India must be countered at every turn; that nuclear weapons have endowed Pakistan with security and status; that the fight for Kashmir is unfinished business from the time of partition; that large-scale social reforms such as land redistribution are unacceptable; that the uneducated and illiterate masses deserve only contempt; that vociferous Muslim nationalism is desirable but true Islamism is not; and that Washington is to be despised but fully taken advantage of. ‘Retention of power’, however, remains the driving force for the components of the Establishment.
The Establishment is increasingly unpopular amongst the educated of Pakistan who blame its obsession with Kashmir as the root of all ills affecting Pakistan. The Jihadi plot has backfired, Pakistan is increasingly seen as fomenting terrorism by the international community, Jinnah’s dream of a secular Pakistan is in tatters with communal forces wreaking havoc and the Americans, once valued-allies, view Pakistan unfavourably[19].The military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) abhorallowing the civilian government to normalise relations with India. Recent incidents along the Line of Control and the terrorist strikes in Jammu are testimony to this mind-set. The former appeared a response to Nawaz Sharif’s expression of willingness to reinvigorate relations with India in the aftermath of his election and the second was ostensibly to derail the talks between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan on the side-lines of the UN summit in New York. To suit its end of retaining relevance and continue to be hailed as the saviours of Pakistan, the Pakistan Army will continue to retain the anti-India rhetoric in action if not words.
The Afghan War
No country has been more affected than Pakistan by the American-led Global War on Terror. An increasing section of society stands radicalised in the name of Islam. Militant groups have stepped in to provide employment and education where government efforts have failed. The betrayal of the Afghan Taliban by the Pakistan government of the day and subsequent crackdown on militant groups has led to the rise of the TTP and targeting of government and military men and infrastructure is now a common occurrence. Not only has the writ of the Army been challenged but also defeated in some cases. The Army is caught between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand it wants out from its participation in the war on terror, hoping that once it can demonstrate its non-complicity in the drone attacks and consequent killing of civilians, the militants in the tribal areas will cease to target the Army and symbols of government presence. On the other hand, it suspects that the stated aim of the TTP to establish Sharia in Pakistan will continue to fuel the conflict between the Army and the militants as the latter endeavour to expand their influencetowards Islamabad and Rawalpindi.The new Pakistan Army Doctrine[20] identifies home-grown terrorism as the most acute threat facing the country, trumping India as the Number One Enemy.
Nuclear Arsenal
Pakistan continues to abet terrorism in parts of India including Kashmir in the safety of deterrence from its nuclear capability. Not that the Indians would have acted tough otherwise, but it’s a factor nevertheless. The nuclear warheads also guarantee that infinitely stronger states like the USA cannot wring its arm beyond a point. Particularlywhen it comes to acting against militant groups that it considers its strategic assets in the struggle against India. It further ensures that the West and India take keen interest in the stability of Pakistan, the former through generous hand-outs of funds and war material to keep the Army engaged and the latter through its predictability in respecting established and easily gauged thresholds. Pakistan, despite its poor proliferation recordhas to its credit a well-drafted nuclear doctrine[21] and its capability to protect its nuclear assets have not come into serious question. The establishment of the National Command Authority[22] and the Strategic Plans Directorate[23] confirm the significance accorded to the issue. The Pakistan Army carries disproportionate weightage in both organisations and it is widely believed that despite the pretence of the nuclear button being in civilian control, the Army will call the shots if push comes to shove in a conflict with India.
Judicial Activism
While it can be argued that judicial activism tends to tread the domain of the legislature and the executive, the Supreme Court of Pakistan, led by the persistent Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhary, has called the bluff of the military. A dogged effort on its part has acted as a counterbalancing force to the undisputed powers that General Musharraf had cobbled for himself through the 17th amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan. In the process it has lent spine to the political class inducing also the required caution in cases of corruption. While the removal of the Prime Minister[24], Yusuf Raza Gilani, was ill-timed with the country reeling under several crises at that point in time, the Chief Justice of Pakistan sent out a strong message to those who took positions of power for granted. The Supreme Court of Pakistan is now an active institution that holds the power wielders accountable in consonance with the Constitution. If the Supreme Court can ascertain where to draw the line between judicial activism and judicial dictatorship, it will gain the trust of the millions who expect honest administration. In the absence of an effective executive and with a lame legislature, the Supreme Court may well be a stabilising factor in the long run.
The Foreign Hand in Pakistan
This is the singular biggest reason for the current turmoil. Actual or virtual presence of the US has undermined the Pakistan Army, drone strikes create more militants than they neutralise and, the balance of power between the central and provincial governments has been disturbed by US urgings to back words with actions. More importantly, it has spread disaffection in the ranks of the military on two counts. The more nationalist elements, especially junior officers and men, are disappointed with the hierarchy for caving in to US demands and with Pashtuns comprising the second largest ethnic group in the Army, the Army is unhappy fighting its own brethren. The military approach has opened up historical fissures and in turn has caused the militants to turn inwards and attack the Pakistani establishment, spreading the region of turmoil beyond the frontier provinces.
Further, a new-found Indo-US relationship has prompted the Americans to pressurise Pakistan to cease support for cross-border terrorism in Kashmir. This found grudging favour with the Pakistani Establishment. So, while the flow was reduced to an ebbin Kashmir; Mumbai, Delhi, Gujarat, Jaipur, Hyderabad, Bangalore and elsewhere witnessed terrorist attacks. More often than not, the execution or abetment of these acts has been traced conclusively to Pakistan. But with the American misadventure in Afghanistan drawing to a close, Pakistan is again qualitatively stepping up the ante in Kashmir. Clearly, there is no change of heart as some had hoped.
Pakistani Society and Media
The best indicator of hope for eventual stability in Pakistan stems from the society at large. Barring the radicals, who have little following but manage an impact thanks to their vile ways, the common Pakistani is not blind to reason. This is amply demonstrated in the outpourings against radicalisation and violence in the media, which like everywhere else ostensibly panders to the common thought. The mainstream media, a few instances of targeted killings notwithstanding, has been independent and expressive in their judgment of contentious issues like religious bigotry and Indo-Pak relations. Indeed, the media and civil society has encouraged Track II diplomacy to the point where it (albeit unrealistically) seems like the primary option for confidence building between the two countries. The media has been quick to dismiss the misgivings of the Army, applaud statesmanship emanating from India and taken the lead to redirect Indo-Pak relations. The Pakistani media and society hold the mirror in which a coherent Pakistan shines through.
Conclusion
For a long while now it has been the trend to deplore the news emanating from Pakistan.The international community will do well to remember that they all, especially India, have a huge stake in the stability of Pakistan. Triumph of religious bigotry anywhere will be the beacon that will light a thousand fires. Even as violence and a breakdown of law and order rules the airwaves and print media, the large majority of Pakistanis yearn for peace and support decisive action against the radicals. A secular mind-set pervades most of Pakistan and the Establishment must ensure that this voice gains prominence. The Pakistan Army is strong enough to prevent state failure but in order for it to transform Pakistan it must reconsider its priorities. The Army doctrine has rightly identified the primacy of dealing with extremists, but this thought is not matched by action. It continues to run with the hares and hunt with the hounds, basking in the practice of its theory of unpredictable belligerence towards India. The strategic assets that it leaves untouched now will be the ones that Pakistan will be fighting in the future. While most are expected to learn from history, Pakistan will do well to learn from the present.
In sum, despite portentous signs, Pakistan is best described as a nation that, given its Army, higher judiciary, media and a vibrant society, refuses to fail.
Endnotes
[1] FSI for 2013 is available at http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable. Accessed on 26 September 2013.
[2] The 12 indicators are Demographic Pressures, Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, Group Grievances, Continual Human Flight , Imbalanced Economic Development, Poverty and Economic Decline, Legitimacy of the State, Public Services, Human Rights, Security Apparatus, Factionalised Elites and Foreign/External intervention. Details are available at http://ffp.statesindex.org/indicators. Accessed on 26 September 2013.
[3] The threat was considered so prominent that in 2004 the US government established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (OCRS). The OCRS’s mission statement describes failed states as breeding grounds for terrorism. The role of ‘successful’ societies like the USA, UK, France and Saudi Arabia in cases where people born and brought up in these countries resort to terrorist violence is mostly under-reported.
[4] For an exposition debunking any causal link between terrorism and failed states see The Myth of the Failed State and the War on Terror: A Challenge to Conventional Wisdom, Aidan Hehir published in the Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding (November 2007).
[5] The FSI is evaluated out of a maximum possible of 120 points. Each of the 12 indicators is evaluated out of 10. The more points that are scored, the more dismal the performance of a State is purported to be and higher is the rank.
[6]Available at http://ffp.statesindex.org. Accessed on 26 Sep 2013.
[7] Stephen Cohen in his book The Idea of Pakistan terms this failure that affects other states as catastrophic failure. He further identifies four other kinds of failure – the failure to live up to past expectation, the failure of vision, economic failure and failure of leadership.
[8]Beyond Crisis: Re-evaluating Pakistan, Naveeda Khan, Routledge 2010.
[9]State of Islam: Culture and Cold War Politics in Pakistan, SaadiaToor, Pluto Press 2011.
[10]AbulAlaMaududi was a journalist, political philosopher, and an Islamist thinker in India, and later Pakistan. He was also the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami.
[11]The world community of Muslims.
[12]Report of the Commission on Sports, Culture and the Arts, Faiz Ahmed Faiz, quoted in A National Culture for Pakistan: The Political Economy of a Debate, SaadiaToor, Inter-Asia Culture Studies, pp 318-340.
[13] The ARD comprised the two main political parties of Pakistan, the Pakistan’s People’s Party and Muslim League (Nawaz). It may have been inspired by the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) that was cobbled together to oppose the dictatorship of General Zia-ul-Haq.
[14] Direction of prayer
[15] The SSP openly operates under the adopted name of AhleSunnatwalJamaat but is still popularly referred to by its former name.
[16]Pakistan's Hazara Shias Living Under Siege, AsadHashim, 18 Jan 2013, available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/01/2013117124512947691.html accessed on 27 Sep 2013. In the article the author alleges, ‘In interviews with Hazara activists, allegations of Frontier Corps complicity in the killings were repeatedly made by all who spoke with Al Jazeera. Several cited examples of attacks - including the offloading of Hazaras from buses, to be shot at point-blank range at the side of the city's main international highway - having occurred within metres of FC checkposts’.
[17] The Pakistan Army has a sizeable subscription from the Baluchis and Pashtuns. Getting severely engaged in the heartland of this recruitment base is fraught with the dangers of infusing discord within its ranks. The other major consideration is outlined in Christine Fair’s The Militant Challenge in Pakistan, Asia Policy, January 2011, wherein the authors expands upon Deobandi groups like the Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Haqqani Network and the Afghan Taliban that are viewed as assets by the Pakistan Army against India. Further, the Shakai Accord (signed by Nek Mohammed, South Waziristan) and Sararogha Agreement (signed by BaitullahMehsud) are testimony to the Pakistan Army conceding and ratifying defeat in a ‘live and let live’ deal with the militants.
[18] One description of the Establishment has been given by Stephen P. Cohen in his book the Idea of Pakistan. Membership in this oligarchy, Cohen contends, requires adherence to a common set of beliefs: that India must be countered at every turn; that nuclear weapons have endowed Pakistan with security and status; that the fight for Kashmir is unfinished business from the time of partition; that large-scale social reforms such as land redistribution are unacceptable; that the uneducated and illiterate masses deserve only contempt; that vociferous Muslim nationalism is desirable but true Islamism is not; and that Washington is to be despised but fully taken advantage of. Underlying these "core principles," one might add, is a willingness to retain power at any cost.
[19] Results of a Gallup Poll indicate that 81% of Americans view Pakistan unfavourably. Available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/161159/americans-least-favorable-toward-iran.aspx.Accessed on 27 Sep 2013. Expectedly, a Pew Poll establishes that 74% of Pakistanis view America as an enemy. Pakistani Public Opinion Ever More Critical of U.S. available at http://www.pewglobal.org/2012 /06/27/pakistani-public-opinion-ever-more-critical-of-u-s/. Accessed on 27 Sep 2013.
[20] New Doctrine: Army Identifies ‘Homegrown Militancy’ as Biggest Threat, published in the Express Tribune, January 3, 2013, available online at http://tribune.com.pk/story/488362/new-doctrine-army-identifies-homegrown-militancy-as-biggest-threat/.Accessed on 27 Sep 2013.
[21]Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine, Lt Gen (Retd) Sardar FS Lodi, an analysis of the nuclear doctrine of Pakistan available athttp://www.defencejournal.com/apr99/pak-nuclear-doctrine.htm. Accessed on 27 Sep 2013.
[22] For the gazette notification of the National Command Authority of Pakistan see http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1300934560_193.pdf. Accessed on 27 Sep 2013
[23]Also called the Strategic Plans Division (SPD). A broad view of the SPD is available at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) website at http://www.nti.org/facilities/585/. Accessed on 27 Sep 2013.
[24] The Supreme Court disqualified the Prime Minister Yusuf RazaGilani from holding office on charges of contempt of court because he failed to proceed against the President, Asif Ali Zardari on corruption cases.
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