Civil unrest is the making of the civilians (politicians and administrators) and they must shoulder the responsibility to control it with their resource, the police. The current curfew plan is a master-stroke to prevent the Army from staying away from unruly mobs and ensuring its involvement abinitio. However, given the drawbacks, the premature commitment of troops as part of the police curfew plan must be scrapped.
Introduction
The curfew plan, evolved by the civil police post the 2010 protests that rocked the Valley, envisages the occupation of cut-off points by the Army whenever the civil police activate the plan ahead of expected unrest or protests. The Army, blinded by its zeal for synergy, has no say in the activation of the curfew plan and readily complies. While it may seem a matter that is trivial when we encourage police-led rehearsals in the absence of violent mobs to confront, it is the pragmatic analysis of the likely repercussions that must be taken note of.
Genesis of the Curfew Plan
The protests of 2009 and 2010 have been a landmark event for the Valley. Not only did it affirm the sway of the separatists and disruptive elements over disgruntled and unemployed youth but it also taught valuable lessons to the Security Forces in crowd management and control. The genesis of the curfew plan lies in the lessons that the civ police has learnt from the non-involvement of the Army in the controlling of the mobs. The Army emerged stronger from its justified non-participation and with an enviable moral ascendancy. It has left certain quarters of the police singed that the Army refused to step in and surfaced with an enhanced people friendly image while that of the police has been tarnished beyond redemption, or so it seems.
The current curfew plan is a master-stroke to prevent the Army from staying away and involving it abinitio. It envisions a police role for the Army, something that the police appear keen on to make up for their own shortcomings and also one we will in hindsight repent once we are made the scapegoats for deterioration in the civil unrest. In case of reservations, ask the CRPF, who routinely lament the same. The police controls the media and the politicians far more effectively than does our hierarchy and so let’s not even go there to provide a counter-view.
Assessment of the Army’s Role
The Army is primarily meant for CT ops and civil disturbance must be the exclusive domain of the civ police, till the situation so deteriorates that the Army has to be requisitioned. This stance is supported by the various advisories and instructions issued by our establishment. By agreeing to the curfew plan proposed by the civil police we have played into their hands, for now, there cannot be a civil situation that we will not be embroiled in from the start.
Committing the troops to man cut-off points even before the situation has come about and the civil police tried, lends itself to several disadvantages. In a role reversal, the Army will be the first uniformed force that the mob will come across. Even if the crowd is not menacing, the Army has, and rightly so, no non-lethal measures to dissuade them from progressing. Mere warnings, even in vernacular, are unlikely to have the desired effect and the next calibration available to the Army is effective firing. Below-the-waist fire has the uncanny ability to hit a crouching protester in the head or going way beyond the crowd (a bullet can travels upwards of two kms) and injuring a hapless bystander. And thence the theory of high-handed response and collateral damage perpetuated by the media and lapped up by unsuspecting millions over their morning cuppa.
Any Army response that has not been requisitioned explicitly with the acknowledgement of police failure runs the risk of being pointed-at and abused in the aftermath with a ‘we could have done better’ or ‘they have no idea about such issues’ air. Once the Army steps in to rescue the civil administration the use of lethal force is justified and will be applauded. To that end, requisition in writing, even though not a requirement by law, must be insisted on for committing troops to a situation of civil strife.
Further, the requisition form must contain a clause, suitably worded, which confirms that the DM acknowledges the inadequacy of the police effort to contain the situation and therefore requisitions the Army with full knowledge of the lethal measures that the Army is expected to employ. A statement saying that minimum required force will be used by the Army may be thrown in to ensure the requisition cuts both ways and is not interpreted as a license to kill. Thereafter, the onus of civilian casualties caused during the discharge of duties by Army personnel lies with the civil administration. It will, most importantly, ensure that the weight of calling in the Army is felt by the civil administration and is not resorted to on a whim. This must be ensured even for rehearsals, for which a duly annotated form may be used, to help format the minds of the civil administration and police.
Once requisitioned, the District Magistrate has no say over the method to be resorted to by the Army which must act in consonance with the specified Rules of Engagement. Police methods must not be used to enable a telling deterrence for future situations. However, the District Magistrate may indicate a time when the situation appears to have been controlled. The Army may then disengage, following a tactically prudent decision by the commander of the force to ensure safety of his men.
Even though the Army may be requisitioned when the situation, in the perception of the District Magistrate has exceeded the capability of the police and PMF, the District Magistrate’s decision must be open to a final vetting by the Battalion Commander whose forces have been called for assistance. This is to obviate the finality of an ill-advised requisition and prevent a premature commitment of troops. The Battalion Commander must have a decision matrix with defined decision criteria and decisive points to arrive at a confirmed inundation of the police capabilities and thus meritoriously concur with the request or rule out the participation of the Army. This decision matrix must cater for forecasting of the level of threat envisaged, activities that unfold prior to and on the day of the protest, criteria to indicate increasing police involvement in several sectors, levels of commitment of the police force judged through move of reinforcements and graduation of police actions from non-lethal to lethal means while controlling the mob, update on situation from own sources and media, nature of the mob assessed from casualties amongst police personnel and destruction of government property, and other pertinent factors.
Of course, the Battalion Commander must be wary of the optimal time to commit his troops, neither too early, nor too late. And if his appreciation of the situation is sound, he will have justifiably committed his troops, with the least riders, in consonance with their military training and at the resolved end of the situation he will have a grateful police and civil administration. Also, the Battalion Commander must appreciate that he decides on behalf of the Army and professional decisions must not be swayed by personal rapport or relations with the civil administration or police officials.
Conclusion
Even as we readily lend our support to the police, the Director General of Police has confirmed his support to the repeal of AFSPA and expressed his capability to counter civil unrest and terrorists unilaterally, that is, without the involvement of the Army. We must not feel guilty of being non-participants, nor must our fervour for collaboration lure us, for civil unrest is the making of the civilians (politicians and administrators) and they must shoulder the responsibility to control it with their resource, the police. None of them were around when we were battling it out and losing lives on the Pir Panjal Mountains and are still doing so on the Shamshabari. We must recognise our role and play it well rather than venture into a quicksand we are ill-equipped to retrieve ourselves from. The premature commitment of troops as part of the police curfew plan must be scrapped.
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