Author: TWI
'India has unfortunately become the "sponge" that protects us all. India's very proximity to Pakistan, which has developed into the epicenter of global terrorism during the last thirty years, has resulted in New Delhi absorbing most of the blows unleashed by those terrorist groups that treat it as a common enemy along with Israel, the United States, and the West more generally...'[1]
'India has unfortunately become the "sponge" that protects us all. India's very proximity to Pakistan, which has developed into the epicenter of global terrorism during the last thirty years, has resulted in New Delhi absorbing most of the blows unleashed by those terrorist groups that treat it as a common enemy along with Israel, the United States, and the West more generally...'[1]
- Ashley J Tellis
The above statement is an oft-quoted observation that captures the inability of India to respond effectively to the challenge of terrorism afflicting it with sickening regularity. To the layman, the nation, in the face of grave losses in life, material and reputation inexplicably refuses to acknowledge the strategic impact of the ever-growing irregular and hybrid threat that is engulfing regions of the world. India’s counter to the threats it faces can be labelled reactive at best, despite the aggressiveness associated in social media with the National Security Adviser[2] and the Prime Minister. The much touted cross-border raid against NSCN militants[3] is too little, too late; but a heart-warming event nevertheless. However, can India call Pakistan’s bluff on the West?
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The recourse to restraint and diplomatic offensive resorted to by India has become jaded and has not yielded any amount of appreciable success. To its credit and wisely so, India has not been sucked into fighting other people’s war. But the same yardstick cannot be applied when one needs to fight its own war, one that affects India directly. ‘Sometimes the War comes to you. When it does, you can either fight or be vanquished,’ is a refrain often heard in military circles. It is apt to describe the predicament that India finds itself in, one that it does not appear willing to extricate itself from in a hurry. Hafiz Saeed and other perpetrators of terrorist acts against India continue to remain at large, Pakistan’s denial on Dawood and Co. continues too and India had to parley for months on end to secure only a limited access to David Coleman Headley. Despite India’s protests, the United States continues to ignore Pakistan’s diversion of military aid to shore up its conventional capabilities against India. This was admitted by Pervez Musharaff in 2009[4] and a Pentagon report tagged a figure of US$ 10 billion worth of military equipment that has been so diverted[5] during Musharraf’s Presidency alone. Pakistan has also modified the US provided Harpoon missiles and the P3C Orion Maritime Reconnaissance aircraft in violation of the conditions for military aid[6].
India’s failure to respond appropriately to the terrorist incidents in Jammu and Kashmir has resulted in the spread of incidents to the rest of India. The pattern of recent attacks indicates a discernible shift of terrorism from Kashmir specific rural areas to pan India urban areas. And this will continue to be the norm because of the high visibility such incidents garner.
Despite adequate evidence to the contrary, Pakistan denies supporting its strategic assets in Lashkar-e-Taiba, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Hizbul Mujahideen and Jaish-e-Mohamed, organisations that are directed at India[7]. So too, the support for Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network to deny space to India in Afghanistan has never dwindled and these organisations have been used by Pakistan to launch attacks against Indian interests in Afghanistan over the past several years. Some remarkable ones[8] include the suicide attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul in July 2008 that killed 66 persons. The killed included two senior diplomats, Political Counsellor V. Venkateswara Rao and Defence Adviser Brigadier Ravi Datt Mehta. In October 2009, the embassy was targeted again killing 17 persons and injuring over 80. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack and identified the bomber as Khalid, Al Jazeera TV channel said. Then in February 2010, Taliban militants carried out coordinated suicide attacks at two hotels in Kabul, the capital city of Afghanistan, killing at least nine Indians, including two Indian Army Majors. At least 10 others, including five Indian Army officers, were injured in the strike that killed eight others, including locals and nationals from other countries. The bombers, believed to be three in number, struck at the guest houses, particularly at Park Residence, rented out by the Indian Embassy for its staffers and those linked to India’s developmental work in Afghanistan. In May 2014, the Indian consulate in Herat province was attacked. This attempt was foiled thanks to five intelligence inputs from CIA with the last coming in a mere two hours before the attack. US State Department Spokesperson Marie Harf said that there was credible evidence that LeT was responsible for the terror attack on the Consulate. Then on 13 May 2015, with India's Ambassador to Afghanistan Amar Sinha as the prime target, militants attacked Park Palace guest house in Kabul's Kolola Pushta area. Four Indians were among 14 persons killed in the attack. "It was known that the Indian envoy would be visiting the guesthouse on Wednesday evening... it appears the Taliban had accordingly planned the siege," the South Asian Terrorism Portal cited an unnamed senior intelligence officer. India has so far been piggy-backing on American intelligence and incidental security provided by the International Security Assistance Force’s presence in Afghanistan[9] and the ominous withdrawal of assets has India sufficiently worried for the Intelligence Bureau, in a presentation to Union Minister of Home Affairs, Rajnath Singh in July 2014, to label the withdrawal of NATO and allied forces from Afghanistan as one of the biggest challenges to India's counter-terrorism measures.
But then, what is India’s plan? Beyond Afghanistan, NATO has its own challenges in Ukraine, Syria and Russia. But post-2014 scenario in Afghanistan, India has opportunities to expand its role in the region and take the crucial responsibility of leading the international community in sustaining a stable and functional democratic government in Afghanistan on the one hand and to deal firmly with the challenges of threat perception from the non-state actors hostile to India operating from the Afghan soil on the other hand. The presence of ISIS in Afghanistan has direct security implications for India. Therefore, as developments in Afghanistan will directly impinge on India's security, the present and future demands that the government of India should craft a futuristic policy and execute it strategically to seize the opportunity in Afghanistan. It is in the interest of not only India but entire South Asia and also in the interest of Central Asia that the rein of Afghanistan should not be handed over to the radicals once again.
It is fairly well established that Afghanistan has large deposits of mineral and hydrocarbon resources. It's underdeveloped yet significant agricultural and human resource potential, and its strategic geographical location at the crossroads of Central, South, West Asia and Eurasia, offer vast opportunities for foreign investment, trade and transit connectivity. In view of this India hosted an investment summit, the third in the series and the first in South Asia, organised by the Confederation of Indian Industries in June 2012 in New Delhi. The ostensible aim of the summit was to attract investments for Afghanistan and ensure that the country's economic and transit potential becomes its inherent strength to accrue the much needed economic dividends for itself and the region. The summit was believed to be a part of New Delhi's efforts to 'stay the course' in Afghanistan, in an uncertain environment. Criticised sometimes in the West, for freewheeling in on the sweat and blood of the NATO-led ISAF to engage exclusively in aid-giving and economic reconstruction activities, New Delhi appeared to have cast its dice in favour of lifting its game in Afghanistan from development assistance to trade and investment. In its engagement with Afghanistan spanning over a decade, as a long term stabilisation partner, India's assistance centred on the plank of economic reconstruction, infrastructure development, trade and transit connectivity and regional cooperation has accrued tremendous goodwill and appreciation among the Afghans. But sadly, India does not have the means or the will to leverage this goodwill or to act if the pillars on which this good will is placed are attacked. India’s Afghanistan policy appears paralysed, an aid policy substituting for a realistic political strategy. It appears unable to play hard ball diplomacy, fights shy of international commitments unless these are decidedly benign and struggles to bring together the weight of all elements of national power.
In the final sum, Indian efforts and investment in constructing roads, electrical transmission lines, irrigation projects, schools and democratic institutions will come to naught if New Delhi’s only plan is to scoot the scene, as it did in 1996, when the Taliban threat becomes acute. Then, once again, India will claim to live on in the hearts of the Afghans, as Pakistan controls the government in Kabul and continues the scheming against India. “What can we do?” shrug senior Indian officials philosophically; “If we have to pull out, we’ll pull out”.[11] There is one difference though, from the last time around. This time India risks being excluded from Afghanistan indefinitely. There is no Ahmed Shah Masood, Sher-e-Panjshir,[12] to keep the Taliban at bay, the Afghan National Security Force has been established to be suspect in quality of manpower and material, and the off-chance of another event like the 9/11 which provided India an opportunity to re-enter Afghanistan, riding the wave of American intervention, seems remote.
[1] Prepared Testimony by Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 28 January 2009. Available at http://www.outlookindia.com/article/lessons-from-mumbai/239580.
[2] Nitin Gokhale, article, Ajit Doval: The Spy Who Came in From the Cold, NDTV, 30 May 2014 and Yatish Yadav, article, Return of the Superspy, The New Indian Express, 08 June 2014. Available at http://ajitdoval.blogspot.in/2014/06/ajit-doval-spy-who-came-in-from-cold_10.html.
[3] Mugdha Variyar, article, How Indian Army's Rare Cross-Border Op in Myanmar Killed Militants Behind Manipur Ambush, 10 June 2015. Available at http://www.ibtimes.co.in/indian-armys-rare-cross-border-op-myanmar-kills-20-militants-heres-how-it-happened-635317.
[4] Nirode Mohanty, Indo–US Relations: Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Nuclear Energy, 2014, Lexington Books, ISBN 1498503934. p.61. The author has quoted The Dawn of 13 May 2012.
[5] Arvind Goswami, 3 D Deceit, Duplicity & Dissimulation of U.S. Foreign Policy Towards India, AuthorHouse, 2012, ISBN 1477257098. p.191.
[6] Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger, article in New York Times, U.S. Says Pakistan Made Changes to Missiles Sold for Defense, 29 August 2009. Available at www.nytimes.com/2009/08/30/world/asia/30missile.html?_r=0.
[7] Article in The Dawn, 20 May 2011, titled Taliban, LeT clearly regarded strategic assets by ‘some’ in Pakistan: Singh. Available at www.dawn.com/news/630371/taliban-let-clearly-regarded-strategic-assets-by-some-in-pakistan-singh.
[9] Shanthie Mariet D'Souza, article, Building a narrative of 'opportunity' in Afghanistan, 27 June 2012. Available at www.rediff.com/news/column/building-a-narrative-of-opportunity-in-afghanistan/20120627.htm.
[11] Ajai Shukla, article, The Indian Ant in the Afghan Flood, 06 October 2009. Available at http://ajaishukla.blogspot.in/2009/10/indian-ant-in-afghan-flood.html
[12] Mohammad Rasool Shah, article, Remembering Massoud, 10 September 2013. Available at http://outlookafghanistan.net/topics.php?post_id=8231.
[12] Mohammad Rasool Shah, article, Remembering Massoud, 10 September 2013. Available at http://outlookafghanistan.net/topics.php?post_id=8231.
Good analysis ... thought provoking measures to retrieve the situation before its too late!
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