Author: TWI
Genesis
Genesis
It is reasoned that the main motive behind Pakistan’s demand for Kashmir has very little to do with sympathy for a political cause and a lot more to do with water. In order to prevent a conflict between its Punjab and Sindh provinces and to prevent a possible secession of Sindh and Baluchistan, Pakistan needs physical control over the Chenab catchment region in J & K. Thus J & K is a source of Pakistan’s food and water security. The Indus Water Treaty (IWT) was signed in September 1960 between the two nations to ensure equitable sharing of water of the Indus System of Rivers. Nonetheless, Pakistan suffers from paranoia that India has the potential and intent to transform the fertile valleys into barren deserts. And hence its acute interest in wresting Kashmir, that will enable it to exercise physical control over the source of these rivers. Possibly, this is the prime reason why Pakistan is not agreeing to the LC becoming the formal border, because then the headwaters would continue to remain with India. Another compelling reason is Pakistan’s quest for vengeance for the 1971 debacle that brought about the birth of Bangladesh. As part of its Kashmir policy, Pakistan prepared the blueprint of proxy war. The ‘jehadis’, initially bred for Afghanistan, were to be engaged in Kashmir lest they turn on Pakistan. Militant cadres were infiltrated across the border into Kashmir to create terror and mayhem.
Post–September 2011 a major development was the Global War on Terrorism launched by the United States and its allies. Operation Enduring Freedom was launched to hunt down al Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan. After the terror attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, the West was more accommodating towards Indian concerns on terrorism emanating from Pakistan. The dehyphenation with Pakistan, an issue that India was always desirous of, occurred with AfPak being the new buzzword.
Demographic Characteristics
Fifteen per cent of the state’s Muslims live in the provinces of Jammu and Ladakh. They are non-Kashmiris, and by and large stand behind J&K’s association with India except for a few dissenting voices in Doda district. Of the state’s 49 per cent who reside in the Kashmir province, approximately 13 per cent are Shia Muslims who are justifiably wary of Sunni-dominated Pakistan, given the gruesome, deathly trial their ilk is being put through on a daily basis there[4]. Remarkably, just under fifteen percent of the population in Kashmir are the nomadic Gujars and Bakarwals, a people who have demonstrated their penchant for continued association with India. A prime example of this intent being the Militancy Mukhalif Morcha (Anti-Militancy Front)[5] that was formulated in conjunction with the security forces to aid in surveillance of terrorist activity, especially in the higher reaches of the Pir Panjal Mountains. What this translates mathematically into is that the support for secession – moral, material and physical, from within the state of J&K, is thus largely limited to the valley floor residing Sunni Muslim population of the Kashmir Valley, constituting just over 20 per cent of the total population of the state. Now, this segment is influential on two counts. Firstly, the majority of the mainstream politicians belong to this section. Secondly, and equally importantly, the media houses that are the repository of the separatist sentiment are controlled by them. The latter, on account of the sheer force of propaganda, gives the impression to casual readers and observers that separatism is a pervasive sentiment. The other voices of reason and moderation are simply smothered in the discourse. It is this prominent section that repeatedly gives Pakistan’s involvement a lease by colouring public sentiment and polarizing the common man against the Indian public in general and the security forces in particular.
Current Situation
Civil Unrest
Over the past few years, several incidents of organized stone-pelting and civil unrest have characterized the conflict in Kashmir as against the earlier spate of armed violence led by foreign mercenaries. Starting with the Macchil Fake Encounter of 2008, the Shupiyan Twin Tragedy in 2009, the Amarnath Land Controversy in 2010, aftermath of the Afzal Guru hanging and the killings of suspected terrorists in CRPF firing in Shupiyan in 2013, or the death of civilians in Army firing in a case of mistaken identity at Chattergam in 2014, these incidents have prompted shutdowns and street violence over prolonged periods. Backed by Pakistan and Pakistan based terrorist organizations, the Sangbaazi ka daur, or period of stone-pelting was aimed at keeping the controversy of Kashmir as a ‘land under illegal occupation’ alive through an able replacement of overt terrorist action. That Pakistan funded the street protests through Geelani is well known and admitted to by those involved.[6]
Disillusioned by the mindless violence and loss of lives, moderates within the separatist constituency broke rank to speak out for the first time, with exceptional courage and candour, against the terrorists who had hijacked the movement in Kashmir, and who had murdered some of the State’s most notable leaders. In 2011, Abdul Ghani Bhat, chief spokesman of the separatist Hurriyat Conference, backed by Sajjad Lone and his brother Bilal Lone[7] surprised Kashmir-watchers by insinuating:
Lone Sahib, Mirwaiz Farooq and Professor Wani were not killed by the Army or the police. They were targeted by our own people... The story is a long one, but we have to tell the truth. If you want to free the people of Kashmir from sentimentalism bordering on insanity, you have to speak the truth.... Here I am letting it out. The present movement against India was started by us killing our intellectuals... wherever we found an intellectual; we ended up killing him...[8]
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Ghani Bhat directed his ire at Tehrik-e-Hurriyat chairman, Syed Ali Shah Geelani too for misleading the youth and causing avoidable deaths that yielded nothing by way of gains towards the movement for self-determination. He accused Geelani of having “no thinking, no strategy." Geelani has since been more guarded of issuing hartal calendars particularly so since the non-cooperation from the common man was apparent in low enthusiasm for Geelani’s hate speeches and their proclivity to support a peaceful living. Geelani’s strongmen, who enforced the calendar through fear and intimidation, are a despised lot and the shutdown that may be witnessed in a mute picture in a vernacular daily is more a function of an unwilling business community being forced to comply with the diktats of the separatists.
The mainstream media has, despite an initial euphoria over the eroding of the perceived sentiment for street violence, has abandoned the common Kashmiri’s voice that has for long been subdued. Further, and perhaps more unfortunately, the policies of the government of the day, both at the State and the Centre, fixated on conflict management as against conflict resolution, do not resonate with any changes that are reflective of this emerging dynamics. The Army continues to take the lead in a situation that appears ripe for an honest, well-intentioned political approach.
Violence Levels
Having exhibited a steady decline, fatalities related to terrorist incidents have shown a rise over the past two years. Fig 1[9] shows the fatalities for the past five years. Despite Pakistan’s involvement with home-grown terrorism on the Western borders and in the hinterland, it has managed to keep the India-centric terrorist organizations active. International pressure notwithstanding[10], Mumbai attack suspect Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, threatens to walk free and is indicative of Pakistan’s double standards in dealing with terrorist groups. There have been a number of attacks on the Security Forces in recent months[11] and the terrorist organizations have purportedly been asked by their masters in Pakistan to steer clear of causing civilian casualties to retain the last strands of the waning public support, if any.[12] Intelligence agencies report of plans to reset any gains in Indo-Pak relations through the execution of sensational terrorist attacks on the lines of the Mumbai attack.
Year
|
Civilians
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Security Force Personnel
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Terrorists
|
Total
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2010
|
36
|
69
|
270
|
375
|
2011
|
34
|
30
|
119
|
183
|
2012
|
16
|
17
|
84
|
117
|
2013
|
20
|
61
|
100
|
181
|
2014
|
32
|
51
|
110
|
193
|
2015
|
2
|
8
|
22
|
32
|
Fig 1: Terrorist Fatalities 2010-2015 in J&K. Data updated till 05 Apr 2015.
Political Process
Since the 2011 Panchayat elections in which over 79 percent of the electorate exercised their right to vote, the common man stands politically empowered. The Panchayat elections demonstrated the secular nature of the Kashmiri society with minority candidates winning from predominantly Muslim villages. However, with the state government faltering in the devolution of powers to the representatives at the grass-roots level, the backlash was evident in the State Assembly Elections of 2014 for which the results were declared on 23 December 2014. Not surprisingly, the electorate, yet again, threw up a hung parliament. Hectic parleys ensued and lasted longer than envisaged, finally culminating in a PDP-BJP combine with Mufti Mohammed Sayeed as the Chief Minister. Despite the shadow of terrorism that loomed large, with a number of terrorist incidents[13] intended to dissuade the voters, the state witnessed a record turnout of 65.2 per cent. Of the 46 constituencies of Kashmir Division, being mentioned specifically for the perceived support to the separatist sentiment, two recorded more than 80 per cent polling, 19 recorded between 60 to 80 per cent and another eight recorded between 50 to 60 per cent. Also, only seven constituencies recorded polling percentages below 30 and all were from the general area of Srinagar that had borne the brunt of the deluge of September 2014. The low turnout was widely interpreted as the public’s dismay with the politicians in general and their manner of punishing the casual approach of the state government in dealing with the crisis. Pertinently, voting percentage during the 2008 State Assembly elections was pegged at 61.16 per cent, 43.70 per cent in 2002, and 53.92 in 1996, demonstrating not only a steady consolidation of the democratic constituency but more importantly, the desire of the common man for implementation of social development issues and a peaceful living.
Development Activities
A number of development activities have been undertaken both, by the state government and the central government. Security forces have chipped in with high visibility projects under Operation Sadhbhavana. Encouraged by the drop in violence since the heydays of militancy, there has been a profusion of schools, both government and private. The Centre has partnered with the Corporate Sector to launch Himayat[14], an employment scheme which aims at vocational training linked to placement of one lakh youth from the state over a period of five years. Similarly, economic projects such as the Baglihar Dam, the Mughal Road connecting Jammu region to the Valley through Shupiyan and four laning of the Jammu- Srinagar National Highway, to mention only a few, have all given a face-lift to the state and improved the economic prospects for the population. Additionally, the Jammu-Srinagar Railway Link is expected to aid integration of the Valley with the Indian mainland even further.
Perception of the Conflict
A new-found Indo-US relationship post September 2001, though currently being tested by an avoidable diplomatic standoff, has prompted the Americans to pressurise Pakistan to cease support for cross-border terrorism in Kashmir. This found grudging favour with the Pakistani Establishment. So, while the flow was reduced to an ebb in Kashmir; Mumbai, Delhi, Gujarat, Jaipur, Hyderabad, Bangalore and elsewhere witnessed terrorist attacks. More often than not, the execution or abetment of these acts has been traced conclusively to Pakistan. But with the American misadventure in Afghanistan drawing to a close, Pakistan is again qualitatively stepping up the ante in Kashmir. Clearly, there is no change of heart as some had hoped. The West, presently in the throes of Islamophobia, increasingly thinks of Kashmir as a conflict propagated by Islamists.
Internally, the widespread impression that the trend of civil disturbances represent a popular uprising, or that ‘things are worse than they were in the early 1990’s’ is utterly misconceived. The troubles have largely been orchestrated within a minuscule segment of the population, in small areas of the Valley, and the disruption caused is principally a measure of the incompetence of administrative response, rather than of any irresistible upsurge of popular sentiment. The timetables of the stone pelting campaigns have been defined by separatists, in the main led by the Hurriyat Conference – Geelani (G) chairman Syed Ahmed Shah Geelani, backed by Pakistan and its proxy militant groupings in Kashmir. Intelligence available on the profiles of protesters suggests that they include a large number of ‘seasoned campaigners’, provocateurs who have taken up stone pelting as a lucrative business.
Prognosis and Challenges
Governance Post 2014 Elections
Panchayat polls and participation in the elections is not a substitute to overall settlement of political issue of Kashmir. Despite Panchayat polls, Kashmir continues to remain a dispute. I admit that the Kashmir dispute should be addressed politically.
Mr Omar Abdullah, former Chief Minister J&K
The Panchayat Elections 2011 and the State Assembly Elections 2014, are landmarks for the voter participation and the inferred wane in separatist sentiment and sway of the terrorist organizations over the population. However, all the gains can be very quickly lost if the enormity of the moment is not recognized and the leaders squander the capital over narrow political gains marred by a lack of long-term policy. The common man in the state is justifiably wary of the various declarations intent by the politicians in the run up to the elections and they will sit in judgment over every action and spoken word. High voter participation implies higher voter expectations, and both the Centre and the State Government will need to evolve and initiate effective economic and political programmes to meet these aspirations. To falter on this basic aspect will mean providing the space to separatists and their masters across the border to exploit the political disenchantment and induce chaos and insecurity in the society. The unrest from the summer of 2008, 2009 and 2010 are grim reminders of such failures.
Pakistan’s Internal Dynamics
The Establishment: Obsession with Kashmir
The people running the show in Pakistan – the military and intelligence agencies, affluent businessmen, aristocrats, select politicians and civil servants, and academia are popularly referred to as the Establishment[15]. This conglomerate has proved to be the main reason why Pakistan refuses to fail despite all indications to the contrary. Though many ills that confront Pakistan could possibly be traced to the weak policies promulgated by the Establishment, this coterie alone has the necessary expertise and focus of intent towards national security to ensure that Pakistan can continue to survive. The military’s iron-grip on matters relating to foreign policy is a consequence of its effort at maintaining its relevance and retaining power. That the Establishment is nationalistic cannot be doubted. Whether the components of their nationalism are misplaced can be debated no end. ‘Retention of power’, however, remains the driving force for the components of the Establishment.
The Establishment is increasingly unpopular amongst the educated of Pakistan who blame its obsession with Kashmir as the root of all ills affecting Pakistan. The Jihadi plot has backfired, Pakistan is increasingly seen as fomenting terrorism by the international community, Jinnah’s dream of a secular Pakistan is in tatters with communal forces wreaking havoc and the Americans, once valued-allies, view Pakistan unfavourably[16]. The military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) abhor allowing the civilian government to normalise relations with India. Recent incidents along the Line of Control and the terrorist strikes in Jammu are testimony to this mind-set. The former appeared a response to Nawaz Sharif’s expression of willingness to reinvigorate relations with India in the aftermath of his election and the second was ostensibly to derail the talks between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan on the side-lines of the UN summit in New York. To suit its end of retaining relevance and continue to be hailed as the saviours of Pakistan, the Pakistan Army will continue to retain the anti-India rhetoric in action if not words.
Nuclear Arsenal
Pakistan continues to abet terrorism in parts of India including Kashmir in the safety of deterrence from its nuclear capability. Not that the Indians would have acted tough otherwise, but it’s a factor nevertheless. The nuclear warheads also guarantee that infinitely stronger states like the USA cannot wring its arm beyond a point. Particularly when it comes to acting against militant groups that it considers its strategic assets in the struggle against India. It further ensures that the West and India take keen interest in the stability of Pakistan, the former through generous hand-outs of funds and war material to keep the Army engaged and the latter through its predictability in respecting established and easily gauged thresholds. Pakistan, despite its poor proliferation record has to its credit a well-drafted nuclear doctrine[17] and its capability to protect its nuclear assets have not come into serious question. The establishment of the National Command Authority[18] and the Strategic Plans Directorate[19] confirm the significance accorded to the issue. The Pakistan Army carries disproportionate weightage in both organisations and it is widely believed that despite the pretence of the nuclear button being in civilian control, the Army will call the shots if push comes to shove in a conflict with India.
AFSPA: Demonising an Enabling Provision
Jammu and Kashmir is a political situation. It needs political handling. It requires a political package more than an economic package. By political package, I mean dealing with issues like Armed Forces Special Powers Act, footprint of the security forces, rehabilitation package for youngsters who are across the Line of Control and compensation for victims of the ongoing trouble.
Mr Omar Abdullah, former Chief Minister, J&K
Clearly, the Army requires AFSPA as an enabling provision to function amongst the population in a police-like role. Terrorists will find a safe haven in any area where the threat of operations by the Army is low or missing. So, there cannot be partial revocation of AFSPA as it will undermine the Army’s efforts in other areas. Asking for revocation from areas where the Army is anyway not deployed begs the question what inconvenience is being caused by AFSPA if the Army is not present? Where is the danger of misuse? Apprehensions appear to convey that AFSPA is like the Sword of Damocles, the threat of the Army calling-on, even if it hasn’t in years, and hence the law must be repealed from Srinagar. Let’s for a moment consider the common man’s interpretation of AFSPA. In Kashmir, it is synonymous with being frisked, being asked to prove one’s identity and the inconvenience of Cordon and Search operations. For the uninitiated, especially the uninformed youth in the mainland, it is perceived as a provision that allows men in uniform to rape with impunity and kill at will. If that be the substance of the most trusted and professional institution of Independent India, the country stands doomed. The perception, therefore, is as fanciful as Harry Potter’s various adventures. The Act has no provision to protect criminals and 106 Army personnel have been punished by Court Martial while 97% of the 1500 or so charges levelled against Army personnel have been proved to be motivated and frivolous.
Overcoming Shortfalls
Crowd Management vs Crowd Control. Despite a relentless, though low-grade campaign of street agitations and pelting throughout the intervening years since 1990, State authorities were caught completely off guard when the violence escalated towards the end of June 2010, and was constantly renewed as a result of repeated fatalities in Police and CPMF firings. Failures of assessment and response have been endemic throughout this crisis, as have been a range of directionless and unproductive initiatives. Underlying all these, however, was the core lack of concept and capacity. Much has since been evolved with emphasis on crowd management rather than crowd control. Curfew measures have been used effectively particularly against the abettors of street violence. While earlier small, heavily armed units, in some cases issued with additional ‘non-lethal’ weapons, including tear-gas rifles, pellet guns and lathis, were the norm, larger deployments of CPMF, with psychological edge of numbers is now resorted to. Further, the threat of being booked under the despised but necessary Public Security Act is an effective deterrent. The Army plays its role of an effective last resort deterrence by maintaining distance and constituting a threat in being.
Response of the State Apparatus.
I am convinced that the only way forward in Jammu and Kashmir is along the path of dialogue and reconciliation. But I recognize that the key to the problem is a political solution that addresses the alienation and emotional needs of the people. This can only be achieved through a sustained internal and external dialogue. We are ready for this. We are willing to discuss all issues within the bounds of our democratic processes and framework. We must promote economic activity and create opportunities for employment. We must build physical and human resource infrastructure.
Mr Manmohan Singh, former Prime Minister
It is clear that the state apparatus has repeatedly failed to respond to existing and emerging challenges at an appropriate level and with necessary urgency. This is the consequence, simply, of the corruption, ineptitude, neglect or failure of successive administrations. The unfortunate reality is that most Government ‘plans’, ‘policies’ and ‘strategies’, remain altogether indifferent to, and uninformed by, the contours of enduring vulnerabilities and structural obstacles. Indeed, the shortfall stems from extremely uncertain capacities of implementation. It is all very well to talk about ‘comprehensive’ and ‘special’ plans, with their focus on connectivity, health, education and poverty alleviation, but, as the then Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh very rightly noted at the Chief Ministers’ meet (to address the growing Naxal menace) on July 14, 2010, "Without adequate and reasonably efficient staff, it would be difficult to implement any strategy or programme for these areas." Terrorism and insurgency threaten the viability of democratic governance in the near term; developmental solutions can be realized – if at all – over the medium and far term. Hence uprooting malpractices and corruption, the major cause of resentment against the State in J&K, is vital for the people to see light at the end of the tunnel.
Attitudinal Change in Pakistan
Pakistan, as has been the vein of this article, seems destined for continued indulgence with its infamous ‘terrorism as a state policy’ stratagem. The gruesome massacre of school children in Peshawar, offered an opportunity for Pakistan to get the monkey off its back. But sane opinion appears to be a rarity in that country and Pakistan is back to its nefarious ways sooner than some predicted, with the execution of terrorist attacks planned and sponsored from its soil and misleading allegations[20] of an Indian hand in the Peshawar massacre doing the rounds. While diplomatically, India seems to be getting the better of Pakistan, it has not translated into stemming terror activities. It is to India’s credit that it continues to engage Pakistan in matters of trade, travel, tourism, transit, investment, infrastructure development and energy- related cooperation while sending across terse messages, both verbally and in action, on issues such as cross-border firing and terrorism. India has provided Pakistan ample chances to pursue a peaceful option while also allowing its political leadership strength to move out of the shadows of the war-mongering Army. Unfortunately, the Army has an iron-grip on matters relating to foreign policy and particularly insofar as matters India are concerned and no headway seems to have been made in weaning Pakistan away from its fascination with proxy war.
Conclusion
Violence in J&K has diminished to a tiny fraction of the peak of 2001; large numbers of terrorists are believed to have left the Valley, even as others are eager to return from their safe havens in Pakistan, to a normal life at home; the stamina for mass agitation is running low. Despite the recent attempts at increased infiltration, ostensibly to target the poll process of 2014 and to unsettle the new government, the security situation remains well under control. This would be an opportune moment for the democratic leadership in J&K to seize the initiative, using their electoral legitimacy to address political grievances. Internationally, India must continue to maturely address Pakistan and gradually make the prospect of a proxy war untenable for it.
[1] Jammu & Kashmir: Self-Determination and Secession , excerpted from Asian Commentary, Vol. 1, No. 3, July-September 1999, Jammu, India. Available at http://iref.homestead.com/Secession.html. Accessed on 21 Mar 2014.
[2] Evans, Alexander. "A Departure from History: Kashmiri Pandits, 1990–2001". Contemporary South Asia 2002(11):1.
[3] The primary languages of Ladakh are Ladakhi and Balti; of Jammu, Dogri, and of Kashmir, Kashmiri. In addition, Gujari, Pahari, Punjabi, Shina and various dialects and mixed languages are also spoken by different ethnic groups within the state. As can be expected, a sizeable population speaks more than one language.
[4] Sectarian strife in Pakistan comprises the bloody carnage targeted at Shias, Ahmadis and other minorities. Massacres are an increasing norm with an alarming trend of collusivity from the security agencies.
[5] Ethnic Identities and Political Deadlock in Jammu and Kashmir, Professor Hari Om, The Indian Defence Review, © 1995 by Lancer Publishers & Distributors.
[6] Masarat Alam, chief of the Muslim League, a constituent of Geelani’s Tehrik-e-Hurriyat, who had engineered and enforced the ‘calendars’ of shut-downs and stone pelting from the underground, admitted that he had received INR 4 million from Geelani through different channels to fuel the protests and incite the stone-pelters. Regrettably, he stands released from custody by the Mufti-led state government in an act that smacks of state appeasement of an established violence-inciter.
[7] Gani Lone’s sons, Sajjad and Bilal Lone, regretted their own past failure to expose their father’s assassins, because of "an element of fear". See N.8 below.
[8]Ajai Sahni, Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management J&K: Politics in the Labyrinth. Mirwaiz Mohammad Farooq, father of Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, the current chairman of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference-Mirwaiz (APHC-M), was killed on May 21, 1990; Abdul Gani Lone was killed on the same date in 2002, while participating in a programme commemorating the late Mirwaiz’s death anniversary; Professor Abdul Ahad Wani was killed on December 31, 1993; each of them by "unidentified gunmen".
[9] Figures from the South Asian Terrorism Portal available at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/data_sheets/annual_casualties.htm. Accessed on 11 Apr 2015. The figures are updated to 05 Apr 2015.
[10] ‘US Warns Pakistan over Release of Lakhvi’, Published in Dawn, April 13th, 2015. Available at www.dawn.com/news/1175595/us-warns-pakistan-over-release-of-lakhvi. Accessed on 14 Apr 2015.
[11] 5 December 2014, and 20 – 21 Mar 2015, in particular, recorded coordinated attacks by terrorists. The first which resulted in at least 21 fatalities, including eight terrorists and two civilians was the highest fatality figure for a single day since May 23, 2004, when at least 30 persons were killed in an Improvised Explosive Device blast at Lower Munda, near Qazigund, on the Srinagar-Jammu highway.
[12] ‘ISI has told Militants to Target Security Forces’, published in The Hindu, 06 Apr 2015. Available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/isi-forcing-militants-to-attack-indian-security-forces-says-mha/article7074270.ece. Accessed on 14 Apr 2015.
[13] See N.11. The attack of 5 December was coordinated to be affected post the first phase of the State Assembly Elections.
[15] One description of the Establishment has been given by Stephen P. Cohen in his book the Idea of Pakistan. Membership in this oligarchy, Cohen contends, requires adherence to a common set of beliefs: that India must be countered at every turn; that nuclear weapons have endowed Pakistan with security and status; that the fight for Kashmir is unfinished business from the time of partition; that large-scale social reforms such as land redistribution are unacceptable; that the uneducated and illiterate masses deserve only contempt; that vociferous Muslim nationalism is desirable but true Islamism is not; and that Washington is to be despised but fully taken advantage of. Underlying these "core principles," one might add, is a willingness to retain power at any cost.
[16] Results of a Gallup Poll indicate that 81% of Americans view Pakistan unfavourably. Available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/161159/americans-least-favorable-toward-iran.aspx.Accessed on 29 Mar 2015. Expectedly, a Pew Poll establishes that 74% of Pakistanis view America as an enemy. Pakistani Public Opinion Ever More Critical of U.S. available at http://www.pewglobal.org/2012 /06/27/pakistani-public-opinion-ever-more-critical-of-u-s/. Accessed on 29 Mar 2015.
[17]Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine, Lt Gen (Retd) Sardar FS Lodi, an analysis of the nuclear doctrine of Pakistan available at http://www.defencejournal.com/apr99/pak-nuclear-doctrine.htm. Accessed on 27 Mar 2015.
[18] For the gazette notification of the National Command Authority of Pakistan see http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1300934560_193.pdf. Accessed on 27 Mar 2015.
[19]Also called the Strategic Plans Division (SPD). A broad view of the SPD is available at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) website at http://www.nti.org/facilities/585/. Accessed on 27 Mar 2015.
[20] ‘Musharraf Blames India for Peshawar Massacre’, published on 17 Dec 2014 on http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/attack-in-delhi-26-11-lashkar-e-taiba-terror-plan-hafiz-saeed/1/407381.html. Accessed on 04 Apr 2015.
